LEO LAW LEGAL UPDATE 2026-1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Cannon v. Filip
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
24-3113
December 31, 2025
Summary: Warrantless entry into a home was supported by the Emergency Aid Exception, where officers responded to a 911 call and heard loud noises.
In June 2021, police officers in Aurora, Illinois responded to a 911 call from a woman who reported, based on information from her nephew, that Antron Cannon was violently assaulting a woman inside his home. Officers arrived to find Cannon and a companion inside the house. There were discrepancies between Cannon’s account and that of other witnesses regarding what occurred, but responding officers heard loud noises, received confirmation that no one had left the home, and were told a side door was unlocked. They entered the home without a warrant, detained Cannon, and interviewed his companion, who alleged that Cannon had assaulted her. Physical evidence of injuries was documented, and Cannon was arrested for domestic battery, though the charges were later dropped.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, reviewed Cannon’s subsequent civil lawsuit against the officers and the city. Cannon claimed the officers unlawfully entered his home and arrested him without probable cause. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and probable cause supported the arrest.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the officers’ warrantless entry was reasonable under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment, given the information available to them at the time. It further held that probable cause existed for Cannon’s arrest based on statements and observed injuries.
https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-3113/24-3113-2025-12-31.pdf
United States v. Raban
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
24-1359
December 30, 2025
Summary: Warrantless protective sweep of the vehicle under Michigan v. Long was lawful where officers had reasonable suspicion detained occupant was presently armed and dangerous.
Police officers stopped a motorist for driving without a front license plate and failing to use a turn signal in a high-crime area of Denver known for gang activity. The driver, Antoan Raban, was identified as a member of the Tre Tre Crips gang and was operating within the territory of the rival Bloods gang. During the stop, a known Crips gang member, Deshay Armstrong, parked nearby, watched the officers, and called Raban’s phone. Raban did not have identification, and a records check revealed violent and weapons-related convictions. Officers called for backup, removed Raban from his car to fingerprint him, frisked him, and found no weapons. While preparing to take fingerprints, an officer conducted a protective sweep of Raban’s car and discovered a loaded pistol and ammunition.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Raban’s motion to suppress, finding that under the totality of the circumstances—including the high-crime area, Raban’s gang affiliation, Armstrong’s presence, and Raban’s ankle monitor—the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Initially, the district court questioned whether the officers genuinely intended to return Raban to his car, but later reconsidered and found it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Raban might be released with a citation and allowed to reenter his vehicle.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was presently dangerous and that he might regain access to a weapon in his car if released. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Raban’s conviction, holding that the protective sweep was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, under a totality of the circumstances.
https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1359/24-1359-2025-12-30.pdf
State v. Repple
Florida Supreme Court
December 30, 2025
Summary: Under Florida’s implied consent law, a municipal police officer who makes a DUI arrest within his jurisdiction is implicitly authorized to request a breath test outside his jurisdiction when necessary to complete the statutory process.
Bryan Repple was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol by a Maitland police officer in Maitland, Florida. After the arrest, the officer transported Repple to a breath-test facility outside the city limits in Orange County, where the officer read the statutory implied-consent warning and requested that Repple submit to a breath test. Repple complied, and the test revealed an illegal breath-alcohol level. The central issue in the case was whether the officer, acting outside his municipal jurisdiction when requesting the breath test, had legal authority to do so under Florida law.
The matter first came before a Florida trial court, which granted Repple’s motion to suppress the breath test results, finding that the Maitland officer lacked authority to request the test outside his jurisdiction. The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed this suppression order, concluding that no legal basis existed for the officer’s extraterritorial action, and rejecting the State’s argument that a continuing investigation exception applied. The district court noted no evidence of a mutual aid agreement and found no statutory or judicial authorization for such extraterritorial police power. The Sixth District certified a direct conflict with a decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Torres, which had held that a municipal officer could request a breath test outside his jurisdiction as part of a continuing DUI investigation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that, under Florida’s implied consent law, a municipal police officer who makes a DUI arrest within his jurisdiction is implicitly authorized to request a breath test outside his jurisdiction when necessary to complete the statutory process. The Court quashed the Sixth District’s decision in Repple and approved the result in Torres, clarifying that the officer’s authority arose by necessary implication from the statute.
https://cases.justia.com/florida/supreme-court/2025-sc2024-1088.pdf
State of Minnesota vs. Douglas
Minnesota Supreme Court
December 24, 2025
Summary: The Good Faith exception did not apply because there was no binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing warrantless vehicle searches based solely on the smell of marijuana at the time of the search.
A police officer stopped the appellant's vehicle for traffic violations and discovered that the appellant's driver’s license had been canceled. During the stop, the officer smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Citing only the odor as justification, the officer conducted a warrantless search of the car. During the search, the officer found ammunition in a locked safe in the backseat. The appellant was prohibited by law from possessing ammunition and was subsequently charged with that offense, as well as with driving after cancellation.
The trial court, the Scott County District Court, granted the appellant’s motion to suppress the ammunition, ruling that the search violated his constitutional rights. This ruling came after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Torgerson, which held that the smell of marijuana alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search. The State appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because, at the time of the search, officers could reasonably have relied on existing appellate precedent that arguably permitted such searches.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected the application of the good-faith exception. The court held that there was no binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing warrantless vehicle searches based solely on the smell of marijuana at the time of the search, and previous Minnesota Supreme Court decisions had emphasized the need to evaluate the totality of the circumstances. The court concluded that the good-faith exception did not apply, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
https://cases.justia.com/minnesota/supreme-court/2025-a24-0385.pdf
OFFICER LIABILITY AND USE OF FORCE
Cooper v. Doyle
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
24-2131
December 30, 2025
Summary: Officers denied qualified immunity where the right to be free from deadly force when fleeing and not posing a significant threat was clearly established.
The case concerns the fatal shooting of Kwamena Ocran by four Gaithersburg Police Department officers in January 2021. Ocran, who had recently been released from prison and was reported by a confidential informant to be armed, was surveilled by the officers after the informant indicated Ocran might attempt to sell a handgun. When Ocran left the apartment with the informant and was approached by the officers, he fled. The officers pursued him, and during the chase, multiple officers reported seeing a muzzle flash and believed Ocran fired a weapon in their direction. The officers collectively discharged 27 rounds, resulting in Ocran’s death. Forensic evidence revealed Ocran was shot multiple times in the back, and a handgun was found near his body, though no evidence indicated it had been fired.
After discovery, Melody Cooper, Ocran’s mother and personal representative, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment and rejected their claim of qualified immunity, finding genuine disputes of material fact existed—particularly regarding whether Ocran pointed or fired his weapon at the officers. The court also denied the officers’ motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that, accepting the undisputed facts, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from deadly force when fleeing and not posing a significant threat was clearly established at the time of the incident. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial.
https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-2131/24-2131-2025-12-30.pdf
Bermeo v. Andis
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
24-2047
December 30, 2025
Summary: Audio recording did not “blatantly contradict” the plaintiff’s factual allegations, such as to support dismissal of the complaint.
In September 2020, a college student alleged she was sexually assaulted by a man during a late-night traffic stop in Virginia. She reported the incident to local law enforcement and participated in multiple interviews with detectives, who investigated her claims but found surveillance footage that was low-quality and recorded at a different time than the alleged assault. During a subsequent interview, detectives pressured her about inconsistencies in the evidence, and after the interview, she received threatening text messages. The detectives later told university officials she had confessed to fabricating her report. The sheriff then directed detectives to use her confession as probable cause for an arrest warrant charging her with filing a false police report. After her arrest, officers issued a press release with her personal information and photo, which led to widespread public shaming and emotional distress.
Initially, she was convicted following a bench trial in Washington County District Court, but her conviction was annulled on appeal, and she was acquitted in a de novo bench trial in Washington County Circuit Court. She then sued the officers and the sheriff in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, alleging violations of her constitutional rights and state law torts.
The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), relying on an audio recording of the key interview. The court found that the recording contradicted her claims of coercion, ruling that it demonstrated a civil discussion and that her confession appeared voluntary. It also found her allegation that she had no choice but to confess was not credible based on the recording.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint based on the audio recording, because the recording did not "blatantly contradict" her factual allegations as required by Fourth Circuit precedent. The appellate court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-2047/24-2047-2025-12-30.pdf
SPECIAL INTEREST CASES
Martin v. Goldsmith
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
23-2277
December 31, 2025
Summary: Officer Discipline Case
A former lieutenant in a county sheriff’s office was accused of using excessive force during two arrests. After an internal investigation was initiated, he was suspended and scheduled for a public hearing before a merit board, which is required under Indiana law for disciplinary actions. The lieutenant alleged that the sheriff manipulated both the investigation and the merit board to ensure an unfavorable outcome for him. Faced with the possibility of an unfair hearing and negative publicity, the lieutenant negotiated a severance agreement with the sheriff: he would resign and waive his hearing in exchange for withdrawal of the charges and a promise of a neutral reference.
Despite the agreement, on the day the resignation became effective, two county prosecutors and the sheriff broadly disclosed the excessive-force allegations to local legal professionals and the lieutenant’s current and prospective employers, including through Brady/Giglio disclosures. The disclosures described the alleged misconduct and claimed issues with the lieutenant’s credibility, leading to his suspension from his part-time job and the loss of other employment opportunities. The lieutenant claimed these actions were part of a premeditated scheme to render him unemployable in law enforcement.
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the complaint was dismissed. The district court found that absolute and qualified immunity protected the prosecutors and that the sheriff could not be liable because the lieutenant had voluntarily resigned, waiving his due process rights.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity only for Brady/Giglio disclosures made in pending criminal cases. For disclosures to the bar association and employers, neither absolute nor qualified immunity applied at this stage because the alleged coercion through misrepresentation could constitute a procedural due process violation. The appellate court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2277/23-2277-2025-12-31.pdf
Responses